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We supposed that expenditure growth brought about by an increase of energy price might make 
it attractive for the firms to hide more taxes and social payments in order to compensate this 
growth, which could additionally raise the size of shadow economy. To test this hypothesis we, 
first, used some existing data on the size of the shadow economy for the period of 2000-2003 
derived with the help of DYMIMIC model and, secondly, provided our own estimates the share 
of unofficial sector in GDP using the demand for money method for the period of 2003-2006. 
Testing both the samples showed a positive correlation between the shadow economy size and 
the real energy price.. 
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A. Introduction
The  project  presented  adjoins  the  works  devoted  to  analysis  of  conditions  and  factors  of 
development of shadow economy and its role in general system of economic interrelations. As 
compared to other works on this topic we involve also a factor of prices, namely we take into 
account influence of energy prices on the size of shadow economy. We suppose that at least 
under the high energy price increasing corresponding expenditure growth may make it attractive 
for the firms to hide more taxes and social payments in order to compensate this growth, which 
could additionally raise the size of shadow economy. This is just the working hypothesis we are 
testing.
To provide this analysis we firstly constructed regressions for variables of the size of shadow 
economy existed in the literature and derived with the help of DYMIMIC model for the period of 
2000-2003 (Shneider, 2004). These variables showed themselves positively correlated with real 
energy price in the world economies when a cross country model was applied. At the same time 
using a panel model did not result in sufficiently reliable estimates: given the actually expected 
sign of the coefficient of real energy price increment variable in the regression for the size of 
shadow economy the degree of it’s significance was not sufficient. We addressed this fact mainly 
to a contradictory process of energy price change which by our assumption could block the 
development of the expected interrelation. 
Another  feature  of  the  DYMIMIC  variables  making  them inappropriate  for  our  purpose  to 
analyze the relation between the shadow economy and the energy price – is constructing of them 
with the help of using energy consumption variable as one of the model  indicators.  By this 
reason we fulfilled our own estimations of the size shadow economy. We applied three methods 
which potentially could result in construction of the share of shadow sector in GDP variables. 
These methods did not presuppose to use any indicators of energy and/or electricity consumption 
and, so, could be further applied to explain energy intensity variables. Estimations of shadow 
economy size obtained with the help of these methods showed no correlation either with each 
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other, or with other existing estimations. At the same time they are correlated not sufficiently 
with  either  per  capita  income,  or  any  institutional  indices.  The  demand  for  money  method 
provided for effective results using a cross country model. We made such estimations involving 
the samples for 55 to 61 world economies for the period of 2003-2006 when a stable real energy 
price  growth was taking place.  The analysis  fulfilled further  showed that  our  hypothesis  on 
positive correlation between the energy prices and the size of shadow economy confirmed when 
using both the cross country and the panel data.
B. Review of literature: emergency sources and role in economy
The total scope of literature on shadow economy could be very conditionally broken into two 
parts. In the publications from the first group of sources theoretical models were suggested and 
tested which explained relationship between the size of unofficial economy and a wide scope of 
different factors. It is well recognized that the most important reason for the rise and the growth 
of shadow economy is the tax and security contribution burdens  (Lippert and Walker, 1997; 
Shneider, 1994, 2000, 2003, Johnson et. al., 1998a, 1998b; Tanzi, 1999; Giles et. al., 2002). At 
the same time it is shown that it is not higher tax rates per se that increase the size of the shadow 
economy but  ineffective  and  discretionary  application  of  the  tax  system and  regulations  by 
governments  (Johnson et. al.,  1998b). Tax revenues on there own provide for improvement of 
the governance quality, increase of public goods and, thus, for reduction of the shadow economy 
extent (Friedman et. al., 2000).
Another reason is strengthening of regulation activities of the government and/or institutional 
system shortcomings. In the work of Schneider (Schneider, 2000) it was demonstrated that just 
the  increase  of  tax  burden  and  government  regulation  explained  the  growth  of  the  shadow 
economy income shares in 18 OECD countries over the period 1960 to 1998.  Johnson et. al. 
(1997,  1998b)  showed  theoretically  and  empirically  interrelation  between  the  degree  of 
regulations and the size of the shadow sector. In the recent years literature the overriding role of 
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corruption was stressed,  especially in the developing and transitional economies (Ernste  and 
Schneider, 1998;  Johnson et.  al.,  1998b, 1999; Friedman et.  al., 2000; Johnson et.  al.,  2000; 
Schneider and Enste, 2000; Dreher et. al., 2005; Dreher and Schneider, 2006). Complementarity 
of corruption and the shadow economy was suggested (see also Cule and Fulton, 2005). Stricter 
regulations increase both corruption and the shadow economy; at  the same time the shadow 
economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increase corruption in low income 
countries (Dreher and Schneider, 2006, Schneider, 2006).
Among  the  other  reasons  of  the  emergence  and  growth  of  the  shadow economy a  lack  of 
development of public sector services (Johnson et. al.,  1998a, 1998b; Friedman et. al., 2000) 
reducing governance quality and “tax morality/morale reflecting the readiness of agents to enter 
the shadow economy (Schneider  and  Klinglmair, 2004). In the works (Torgler and Schneider, 
2007a, 2007b) it was analyzed how the individual propensity to pay taxes based on the trust to 
the government policy affected the size of shadow economy. It was concluded that the higher 
propensity reduced the shadow sector .Alexeev and Pyle (2003) emphasize that at least in the 
case of CIS countries “historical roots” of shadow economy should be taken into account. 
The  shadow  economy  affects  economic  growth  of  the  developed,  the  developing  and  the 
transitional economies differently. So, both in the developed and the transitional countries its 
income share is positively correlated with the economic growth, which could be explained by 
benefits  from the  excessive  regulation  evasion  and the  strengthening  of  competition.  In  the 
developing countries such a correlation is negative: less tax revenues means the reduction of 
both regulation quality and public goods supply (Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004). In the article 
of  Polterovich  (1993)  influence  of the  shadow  economy (black  markets)  on  the  incomes 
distribution during transition was analyzed.
The publications from the second group of sources are devoted to measuring of the shadow 
economy size. There are three groups of methods of its estimation being applied by the scholars 
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and  the  experts:  direct  measuring  methods,  indirect  methods  and  an  approach  based  on 
application of  a  modeling multiple  courses  and multiple  indicators of  the shadow economy. 
Direct  approaches are  based  on  direct  replies  or  selected  microeconomic  tax  and  incomes 
audits.  The  group of  indirect  methods includes  analysis  of  detected  discrepancies  between 
certain economic indicators: incomes and expenditures, actual and official labor force, either 
money  transactions,  or  demand  for  money  and  other  macroeconomic  indicators,  electricity 
consumption and aggregate income (1994, 1996; Tanzi, 1982; 1984; Giles, 1999a, Lacko, 1996, 
2000). The authors themselves mention that all the methods referred have their own advantages 
and disadvantages, the latter being associated mainly with concentration on any separate type of 
the shadow activities. 
Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) argue that an approach, which we indicated as the third one, 
based on an the application of a  model including a shadow economy variable as being latent 
and indirectly estimated one provides for taking into account all the main factors affecting the 
development of the unofficial  economy. Both the approach and the model are referred to as 
MIMIC (DYMIMIC: dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) approach and model.  This 
approach was initially used for a cross country OECD analysis (Weck, 1983). Further it  was 
rather broadly applied by other authors (Giles and Tedds, 2002; Bajada and Schneider, 2003; 
Schneider, 2004). Its comprehensive critical analysis was undertaken by  Breusch (2005), who 
came to a conclusion that this method is unfit for the purpose of measuring the share of the 
shadow economy due to its dependence on the units selected to measure the indicators used. 
Nevertheless, DYMIMIC approach stays to be popular at present time.
Estimations for Russian regions were provided by Nikolayenko et. al. (1997), Martynov et. al. 
(1997)  and  by  Komarova  (2003).  In  the  first  work  tree  measuring  methods  using  incomes, 
unemployment and tax revenues were applied. In the second work in order to calculate the size 
of shadow economy in Russian regions a group of indicators (consumption of electricity and fuel 
consumption, transport load statistics, environmental pollution and some others) was compared 
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to legal production and official individual income levels. In the work of Komarova electricity 
consumption  methodology  was  applied.  The  results  obtained  by  the  authors  referred  were 
analyzed both themselves and by other scholars (Popov, 2001). It was found out that the size of 
shadow economy was higher in the regions situated close to the border and negatively correlated 
with the level of crime. Political stability suppressed shadow activities; growth of living standard 
was negatively correlated with shadow economy size. On the other hand official incomes grew 
faster in the regions with higher shadow economy size.
We  didn’t  find  in  the  literature  on  shadow  economy  any  discussions  of  the  questions  of 
production  factor  prices  and/or  cost  influence  on  the  size  of  shadow  economy.  Nor  other 
questions  of  our  concern  are  treated  in  publications  e.g.  those  associated  with  structure 
differences  and  structure  change  or  the  role  of  shadow  economy  as  an  alternative  for 
conservation of production resources. In the present work an attempt is made to meet this lack.
C. Methodology.
a) Theoretical notes. Our work is strongly empirical and devoted to construction of shadow 
economy variables by world countries and to regression analysis of their reaction to various 
factors  including  the  real  energy  price.  However  we  can’t  avoid  completely  a  theoretical 
discussion which could be useful for justification of our working hypothesis on positive and 
significant relation between the size of shadow economy and the growth of real energy price.
In performing the analysis of the formed variables we use the theoretical model developed in 
(Friedman et. al.,  2000). The representative firm when it decides how much of income will be 
“withdrawn” to shadow, solves the following problem: 
Max[(1-t-r)⋅(Y-Y2)⋅R(T)+Y2-(k⋅(Y2)2/2)]                                         (1)
                          Y2
where Y is the total firm’s income, Y2 – its shadow income, t is the tax rate, r – the parameter of 
bureaucratic costs caused by excessive regulation, k – the parameter of effectiveness of the legal 
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system, R(T)  – the payoff of funds invested legitimately, T  – the total tax revenue and dR/dT>0. 
Therefore, in this model it is postulated that all legal net income of the firm is invested and the 
payoff of these investments is the higher, the higher tax collection is and, therefore, the higher 
the supply of public goods and the better the quality of regulation. At the same time, the agents 
have a  motive to  conceal  their  activity,  and this  motive is  the stronger,  the higher  taxation, 
bureaucratic costs and the lower the controls are. The only thing we are adding to this model is 
the parameter R dependence on real average cost: R= R(T, ACOST), so that ∂R/∂T>0 and ∂R/(∂
COST)<0.  The optimal amount of shadow income is
Y2=(1/k)⋅(1-(1-t-)⋅ R(T, ACOST),  if Y2<Y, and                                   (2a)
Y2=Y  otherwise.                                                              (2b)
Therefore, according to the solution of the problem the rise in the prices of resources raising 
expenditure  ACOST can  cause,  at  least  temporarily,  a  tendency  to  growth  of  the  shadow 
economy. Theoretically a  price structure change should immediately cause production factor 
structure adjustment with a reduction of the shares of those of them which became respectively 
more expensive, i.e. in our case – energy. At the same time if the production function has a 
property of constant returns to scale, average real cost comes back to initial level. 
Therefore, from the theoretical point of view influence of the energy price growth on the size of 
shadow economy can not be too important. However, there is an obstacles which sharpen the 
problem because may defeat the recovering of the system. There are serious empirical evidences 
based on the experiences of 1970-80ths years which got fundamental theoretical foundations that 
the effect of energy intensity of production reduction following the increase of energy prices 
occurs immediately only in its part and takes place mainly within the long run period. So, J. 
Sweeney summarizing the experiences of 1970ths – beginning of 1980ths stressed that reaction 
of economy to the energy price change included processes of substitution for energy with other 
factors, substitution for some energy factors with other energy factors, change from production 
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of some final goods to other final goods, change of production structure and combination of 
these processes (Sweeney, 1984). The differences between short run and long run demand price 
elasticities are principal. The short run one expresses change of energy intensity under minimal 
change of proportions of production factors in a use. The long run elasticity on the contrary 
reflects essential change of the total bundle of the production factors used including the fixed 
capital. Since energy consumption equipment generally requests sticky demand for the amount 
of energy consumed, the complete reaction of the system to energy price growth takes place only 
after the complete replacement of this equipment by the new one. However the fixed capital 
often has long exploitation terms and its complete replacement demands foe many years. By this 
reason the long run reaction of the system to price relation change is much higher than the short 
run one. The short run system respond takes place within the period up to 10 years and the long 
run one – not less (and probably essentially higher) than 10 years and is associated with the 
capacities  of  the  economy  to  produce  new  equipment,  investment  process  intensity, 
technological  progress  and  the  economic  growth  rates  (Sweeney,  1984,  Kouris,  1983). 
Convincing evidences to the fact that the energy intensity reduction as a respond to the growth of 
energy price requires just the long time period to be realized were presented by many authors 
who compared the long run and the short run demand for energy price elasticities in different 
countries (Kouris 1981; Welsch, 1989; Beenstock and Dalziel,  1986; Hunt  et.  al.,  2003). So, 
according to Beenstock and Dalziel (1986) the short run and the long run price elasticity values 
in Great Britain differed from each other by 1.6 times in general and for industrial sector – for 
more than 2.6 times. Similar and even more vivid differences were mentioned by other scholars 
for other economies. 
Except for time limitations associated with technological change there are  also other factors 
hindering  a  quick  firms’  adjustment  to  change  of  the  prices  even  if  proper  measures  are 
technically feasible to be made rapidly enough. We wean liquidity constraints which could first 
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of  all  be the  problem of  small  enterprises  especially  in  the  economies  with  not  sufficiently 
developed financial systems, e.g. in the former socialist countries.
b)  Illustration  of  hypothesis  validity:  analysis  of  available  data.  In  order  to  provide  a 
preliminary testing of the hypothesis made, we have used the published data on the size of the 
shadow economy obtained  as  a  result  of  DYMIMIC (dynamic  multiple-indicators  multiple-
causes model - Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004; Schneider, 2004) application realizing that these 
evaluations are not entirely adequate for our purposes because one of the model indicators is the 
relative level of energy consumption.  At the same time analysis of these data confirmed our 
assumption on the positive correlation between the real energy price and the size of the shadow 
economy
First mention that the considered variables of the size of the shadow economy are significant in 
regressions explaining differences in the world economy in energy intensity levels derived as a 
ratio of the total energy consumed in production sphere of the economy to GDP PPP (Table 1). 
These regressions are similar to the regressions substantiated and constructed in (Suslov and 
Ageeva, 2005). Along with temperature regressors (MEATE) and the relative price, energies P/pe 
they include the shadow economy size variable substituting for the institutional variable that 
enters  specifications  discussed in  the  mentioned work.  Here  the  meaning of  the  size of  the 
shadow economy as  a  regressor  seems to  be  that  it  starts  to  play  a  dual  role:  both  as  the 
institutional and structural variable. First, it weighs the quality of institutions in countries and 
thus  explains  differences  in  energy  consumption  efficiency.  In  its  second role,  this  variable 
reveals that the energy consumption observed is overestimated in comparison with its actual 
level because official statistics more completely reflects energy costs in the shadow sector as 
compared to the income earned in it. The variable of the logarithm of the share of the shadow 
economy in GDP is significant, which indicates good reliability of the used data on the unofficial 
sector size. Note also that the real price of energy in these regressions can show endogeneity 
because the energy consumption level can affect the level of this price. Therefore it is required to 
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use a two-stage estimation method with introducing the instrumental variable for the real energy 
price. However, we failed to find such variables. Data for the single, in our opinion, “candidate” 
for this role, notably the level of oil import prices, are available only for 23 countries that are all 
the OECD members  (database statistics  of  the  International  Energy Agency).  Unfortunately, 
these data are insufficient for our purposes.
Table 1.
Production sphere energy consumption in world countries estimated using the shadow economy 
size variable based on DYMIMIC (OLS*, Dependent variable Ln(Energy consumption in the 
production  sphere/GDP), the covariance matrix estimated by the White method)
2000, 70 
observations
2002, 73 
observations
2003, 75 
observations
Constant -.9530,
t-Value=-2.84
.8988,
t-Value=4.29
.8671,
t-Value=4.73
Mean annual temperature: MEATE -.0029,
t-Value=-5.24
-.0020,
t-Value=-3.38
-.0021,
t-Value=-3.75
Real energy price: Ln(P/pe) .2728,
t-Value=2.52
.4082,
t-Value=4.74
.3921,
t-Value=6.39
Ln(Shadow economy share in GDP) .3932,
t-Value=3.25
. .3926,
t-Value=3.74
.3754,
t-Value=3.91
R-squared 0.2927 0.3390 0.3451
F-Value 12.70 15.31 22.25
Root MSE .40273 .41858 .41837
* No data to form the instrumental variable for the energy price.
It turned out to be possible to estimate the variables of the size of shadow economy using the 
regressor  of  real  energy  price  in  the  cross  country  model  (Table  2).  For  each  of  the  years 
considered, for which data on the size of the shadow economy obtained with the use of the 
DYMIMIC method are available, we used the same specification, which besides the variable of 
the real energy price included one of the World Bank indices of the institutional strength, namely 
regulatory quality. The latter is significant and enters regressions with a negative sign, which is a 
natural factor and indicates sufficient reliability of the indices used. The variable of the ratio of 
the average price, i.e. the ratio between the purchasing power parity to the exchange rate of the 
national currency, to the average price of energy carriers also enters the specification with a 
negative sign and is also significant. This means that in those countries where the energy price is 
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higher in purchasing power parity terms, all other conditions being equal, the size of the shadow 
economy is higher too, which is exactly the core of our working hypothesis.
The panel estimation of the growth rates of the shadow economy size on increments of other 
indices is not very convincing (Table 3). Thus, the fact that,  as the regression indicates, per 
capita income growth has resulted in an increase in shadow economy share in GDP can cast 
doubts. The significance level of the variable of relative values also does not seem sufficient, 
though the variable mentioned enters the regression with a “correct” sign. 
Table 2.
Size of the shadow economy* in world countries estimated based on DYMIMIC, with the use of 
the variable of the real energy price (Dependent variable Ln(Shadow economy share in GDP), 
covariance matrix estimated by the White method)
2000, 70 
observations
2002, 73 
observations
2003, 75 
observations
Constant 3.1578,
t-Value=25.11
-1.223,
t-Value=-16.86
-1.1927,
t-Value=-21.82
Real energy price: ln(P/pe) -.3594
t-Value=2.72
-.1698,
t-Value=-2.48
-.1786,
t-Value==2.95
Regulatory quality index: RQ -.2692,
t-Value=-4.96
-.3627,
t-Value=-8.74
-.3786,
t-Value=-10.01
R-squared 0.4592 0.5267 0.5605
F-Value 30.96 40.17 50.94
Root MSE .38845 .36306 .36097
*Variables calculated using DYMIMIC (Schneider, 2004)
Table 3
Evaluation results for the growth of the shadow economy share in GDP Δln(sm) during 2001-
2003 in world countries (panel data obtained based on DYMIMIC, the model with random 
effects,  209 observations, 71 group)
Coefficient z-Value P>|z|
Constant .0069 2.65 0.008
Growth  P/pE -.0057 -1.89 0.059
Growth  ln(GDP per capita) .9265 3.26 0.001
Inflation level .0004   2.14 0.032
Within R-sq 0.0500
Between R-sq 0.0974
Overall R-sq 0.0895
Wald chi2(4)       14.41
sigma_u .01604
sigma_e .01240
Rho .6259
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Not high quality of the panel regression can be mainly explained, in our opinion, by that energy 
prices  were  not  stable  enough  in  the  period  of  2000-2003.  For  example,  according  to 
International  Energy Agency (IEA) data,  in  OECD countries  the average energy price  level 
increased in 2001 and 2003 and decreased in 2002, which might have blurred the influence of the 
price factor on variables of the shadow economy size. This determined our choice of the 2003-
2006 period as most favorable  for sound estimation.
Figue 1. Average Energy Price Change in OECD, 2000=100%
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Data source: International Energy Agency, http://data.iea.org
Another fact that discredits these results is that in the construction of variables of the shadow 
economy based on the DYMIMIC method the energy consumption variable is used. In this case, 
the use of energy prices to explain dynamics of the shadow economy size and its differences 
among countries becomes unacceptable because of systematic errors in statistical evaluation.  
Below we present results of the analysis based on statistical data without energy consumption 
variables for the period with steady rise of prices of energy carriers. 
с) Samples and variables.  We use a sample of countries the number of which is defined by 
availability of statistical data on energy prices, institutional strength indices and estimations of 
the shadow economy income shares. To compare our estimates of the shadow economy with 
other existing estimates we used already published data on shadow economy share in GDP. Their 
source is a sample from (Schneider, 2004) containing estimates for 145 countries of the world 
prepared with the help of DYMIMIC model for the period 1999-2003. Since these data were 
constructed with the help of energy (electricity) demand indicators, strictly speaking, they are not 
appropriate for our purpose. 
We base our statistical analysis on regression of specific demand for energy from the production 
sphere of the economy. To create these regressions the following variables and data sources were 
used (Suslov and Ageeva, 1995):
Y - ВВП по ППС - World Development Indicators 2002 CD-ROM .
E - energy consumption in production sphere - IEA data:  http://data.iea.org.  This variable is 
calculated as the total energy supply in the country subtracting consumption of households and 
non-energy use.
e - energy intensity of production, calculated as E /Y.
MEATE – average annual temperature for the same period and from the same source1990 - data 
from: http://ddcweb1.cru.uea.ac.uk.
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Institutional strength indices - Research project "Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators 
for 1996-2007".  (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/). The total sample consists of the 
following indices (Kaufmann et. al., 2008):
VA (Voice and Accountability) - measures the extent to which citizens of a country are able to 
participate in the selection of governments.
PS (Political  Instability  and  Violence)  -  measures  perceptions  of  the  likelihood  that  the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional means. 
GE (Government  Effectiveness)  -  measures  quality  of  bureaucracy  and  credibility  of  the 
government's commitment. 
RQ (Regulatory Quality)  -  measures incidence of  market  unfriendly policies including price 
controls and inadequate bank supervision.
RL (Rule of Law) - measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society. 
CC (Control of Corruption) - measures perceptions of corruption.
pE - end use energy price for  industry -  data  from IEA: http://data.iea.org and from EBRD 
(Transition Report, 2006). 
P - average output price calculated as a relation of nominal GDP in US$ to PPP GDP.
М0/М2 – share of cash money in monetary aggregate «Money plus Quasi-Money (М2)» IMF 
hard copy issue «International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2006»,
R – deposit interesting rate, World Development Indicators 2008 CD-ROM,
Tr – share of taxes of Central Government on GDP (tax burden), World Development Indicators 
2008 CD-ROM,
Sr – share of subsidies and other transfers in GDP1, World Development Indicators 2008 CD-
ROM,
1 In WDI database the following definition for subsidies indicator: «Subsidies, grants, and other social benefits 
include all unrequited, nonrepayable transfers on current account to private and public enterprises; grants to foreign 
governments, international organizations, and other government units; and social security, social assistance benefits, 
and employer social benefits in cash and in kind» (World Development Indicators 2008 CD-ROM).
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As  instrumental  variables for  institutional  strength  indices  we use infant  mortality  rates  for 
corresponding years. (World Development Indicators 2008 CD-ROM).
The variables of the size of shadow sector we derived we indicated as sm03, sm04, sm05, sm06 
correspondingly for the years of 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006. Alternative data on the sise of shadow 
sector, estimated using the DYMIMIC model we further indicate as ss00, ss02, ss03 for the years 
of 2000, 2002 и 2003 (the data for 2001 were not provided).
D. Estimation of the size of shadow economy by the world economies using the variables of 
cash money
In this section we are discussing both the demand for money method to estimate the size of 
shadow economy, and the results of its application for the samples of 48 to 66 economies and for 
the time period of 2003-2006. We are starting the discussion from the description of the classical 
demand for money method used before by the other authors for the time data series. Further we 
are modifying it to adjust it better to the cross country analysis and contemporary phenomena.
The classical demand for money method is based on an assumption that shadow transactions are 
undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no observable traces for the authorities. 
A strengthening of tax and/or regulation pressure raises shadow economy size and, thus, the ratio 
of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts. We propose here a model following Tanzi 
(1983, see also Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004):
ln (M0/M2)t = γO + γ1 ·ln (1+ TW)t + γ2 ·ln (WS /Y)t + γ3 ·ln (Rt) + γ4 ·ln (yt) + ut       (3)
with γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0, γ3 < 0, γ4 > 0,  
M0/M2 - the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts, 
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TW - a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the shadow economy), 
WS/Y - a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing payment and 
money holding patterns),  
Rt - the interest paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash),
yt - the per capita income. 
The model (3) attributes all the changes in the shadow economy size to the changes of the second 
term in its right side. This means that measuring procedure includes calculating M0 to M2 ratio 
given the lowest (minimum) tax burden and comparing it to its actual level. Further the share of 
shadow economy can be computed given the assumption of a constant money velocity both in 
official and unofficial sectors of economy. 
Since the classical demand for money method to estimate the size of shadow economy as it was 
suggested nut applied by us for the cross country data did not result in workable estimations (see 
below) we modified it. We used as a dependent variable the cash currency to nominal GDP ratio 
and specified its dependence on the tax rate as more complex with respect to the (3).  Besides of 
this to our final specification does not fall the level of per capita GDP and WS to Y ratio since 
they did not demonstrate sufficient significance in our regressions for the years of the period 
2000-2004. As a subsidiary variable we used also one of the indices of institutional strength. .
The classical demand for money method to estimate the size of shadow economy in our work as 
it  was  suggested  initially  but  applied  by  us  to  the  cross  country  data  did  not  result  in  any 
workable estimations. For this reason we modified it. First, to specification which was finally 
chosen did not  enter the variable  WS/Y,  since it  did not  demonstrate  any sufficient level  of 
significance in our regressions. A probable reason for this fact might be essential reduction of the 
degree of monetization of payments to compensate labor due to the spread of new payment 
technologies which did not require using cash money. Secondly, as one of regessors to explain 
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the M0 to M2 ratio we used a share of subsidies and other transfers in GDP which demonstrated 
a stable and high significance in the regressions for the period considered. An explanation for 
this phenomenon may be an assumption that the degree of monetization of subsidies in the sense 
of their transfer into cash money is high.
Modified demand for money method.  For the model of cross country data we have used the 
following specification:
ln (M0/M2) = γO + γ1 ln (1+ Tr)·RL + γ2 ·Sr + γ3 ·ln (R) + γ4 ·ln (y) + u       (4)
that instead of the variable of labor compensation share in GDP includes the share of subsidies 
and  other  transfers  in  GDP  Sr.  As  we  have  already  mentioned,  the  first  variable  lost  its 
explanatory force due to the development of new payment technologies;  the second variable 
turns out to be significant because, as could be expected, subsidies and other transfers have high 
level of monetization. 
Table 4.
Estimation of the cash share (M0) in the M2 aggregate in world countries (dependent variable 
Ln(M0/M2), specification (4) covariance matrix estimated by the White method)
2003, 66 
observations
2004, 65 
observations
2005, 60 
observations
2006, 48 
observations
Constant -1.6838,
t-Value=-7.84
-1.8675,
t-Value=-11.46
-1.8135,
t-Value=-11.11
-1.4790,
t-Value=-5.65
Interactive term: 
Ln(1+Tr)*RL
-1.35334,
t-Value=-2.23
-1.6031,
t-Value=-2.86
-1.7409,
t-Value=-3.98
-1.6274,
t-Value=-2.51
Share of subsidies in 
GDP
4.3305,
t-Value=4.43
4.5747,
t-Value=4.95
3.677,
t-Value=5.03
2.8528,
t-Value=2.90
Ln(Deposit interest 
rate)
-.2581,
t-Value=-3.14
-.2020,
t-Value=-2,93
-.2064,
t-Value=-3.02
-.2294,
t-Value=-2.14
Ln(GDP per capita) -.4665,
t-Value=-4.80
-.4034,
t-Value=-4.92
-.3400,
t-Value=-5.11
-.4021,
t-Value=-3.40
R-squared 0.5594 0.5961 0.6581 0.6841
F-Value 28.29 29.30 40.94 26.53
Root MSE .54562 .50244 .43977 .49331
Another distinction consists in that instead of the tax burden variable ln(1+Tr) the  interactive 
term  ln(1+Tr)·RL is used as the product of the tax burden variable  ln(1+Tr) and one of the 
institution quality indices, namely the Rule of Law RL. The introduction of this variable into the 
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regression corresponds to the representation that the growth of tax level differently affects the 
sizes of the shadow economy in countries with good and bad institutions. In countries with good 
institutions, the growth of tax share in GDP means an increase in tax revenues, and hence, offers 
of public benefits and improvement of the regulatory quality, which reduces the sizes of the 
shadow economy. For countries with bad institutions the growth of tax share in GDP means an 
increase in the tax burden, and hence, expansion of the shadow economy. 
In  our  opinion,  the  estimation  results  (Table  4)  are  fairly  convincing.  The  application  of 
developed models to  estimate  the sizes of  the  shadow economy is  based on the benchmark 
formation and a comparison of the subjects under study with it. Here we have chosen the USA 
economy as  a  benchmark  because  this  country  has  one  of  the  best  statistical  systems.  The 
estimation  procedure  is  as  follows.  Ratios  of  cash  (M0)  and  М2  aggregate  volumes  are 
calculated reasoning from the econometric model parameters that would be if general economic 
conditions common to the USA were implemented in it, but with variables responsible for the 
shadow economy inherent to the given country. This means that for each country the variables 
that are assumed to be not related to the shadow economy are taken at the level of economy-
benchmark (USA), whereas the variables reflecting the sizes of the shadow economy are taken at 
the actual level. A comparison of such a calculation with the USA level yields the correlation 
between the sizes of the shadow economy in the given country and the benchmark country. The 
only one thing left is to find the average size of the shadow sector in the sample as a whole. We 
perform this  only  for  the  year  preceding  the  basic  2003,  having  taken  the  average  shadow 
economy share of income in this year at a level of 33.4%, as determined by Frederic Schneider 
based on the DYMIMIC model (Schneider, 2004). Dynamics of the shadow economy size in 
succeeding years is obtained reasoning from its permanent level in the USA: Despite that the real 
energy price in the USA increased during the period under review, which might have caused the 
growth of the shadow sector share in USA GDP, we performed calculations on the assumption of 
its  constant  share.  Thus,  the  results  obtained  meet  the  condition  of  the  minimum  possible 
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estimation of the growth of the shadow sector share in GDP during the period under review. 
Nevertheless, even these data indicate the growth of the shadow economy size in the time period 
considered (Table 5). Some reduction of the average  level of the shadow economy share in 
2006, as compared to 2005, is explained by a difference in samples: in 2006 the sample was by 
11 countries less, mainly because of exclusion from it economies with the shadow economy size 
higher than the average level. 
Table 5
Variables of shadow economy shares in GDP*: summary statistics 2
. summarize  sm03 sm04 sm05 sm06 
  Variable |    Obs                 Mean                  Std. Dev.                    Min                     Max
      sm03  |    84                  .2949467            .0697882                    .160474               .480375
      sm04  |    83                  .2981553            .0798325                    .138833               .451867
      sm05  |    84                  .3168048            .0933921                    .131651               .494164
      sm06  |    73                  .3148012            .0935924                    .139914               .509000
--------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      ss00   |   108                 .3319722            .1419061                     .086                     .673
      ss02   |   108                 .3404444            .1444899                     .087                     .681
      ss03   |   108                 .3474907             .1477997                    .084                     .683
* sm03, sm04, sm05, sm06 –shadow economy share in GDP in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 
respectively as a result of using the modified money demand method (equation (4), Table 4).
ss00, ss02, ss03 –shadow economy share in GDP in 2000, 2002, and 2003 as a result of using 
DYMIMIC (Schneider, 2004). 
Table 6
Average values of the shadow economy size in the groups of countries in %
2003 2004 2005 2006
sm* ss** sm* sm* sm*
Sample as a whole 29.5 34.7 29.8 31.7 31.5
Former socialist economies 32.7 38.3 32.6 35.3 36.3
CIS countries 36.8 50.5 39.7 41.7 42.9
Eastern European and Baltic 
Countries 
27.2 32.7 30.3 31.4 31.5
OECD economies 21.1 18.3 20.1 20.5 21.2
* result of using the modified money demand method (equation (4), Table 4)
** result of using DYMIMIC (Schneider, 2004)
Unlike  the  data  calculated  based  on  the  DYMIMIC method,  our  estimations  are  much less 
scattered relative to the deviation from the mean of group average values of the shadow economy 
share in GDP for separate countries. A possible reason for this seems to be the use of only one 
2 Data on the shadow economy share in GDP for separate countries are given in Table  A1-A2 in Appendix.
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indicator (money demand), while the alternative approach discussed is based on several criteria. 
One more comment  that  concerns  the data  given in  Appendix,  Table A2:  high level  of  the 
shadow  economy  in  the  USA  (at  a  level  of  25.7%)  that  we  obtained  is  likely  to  be  the 
consequence of using dollars in cash to perform shadow operations beyond the USA. So, part of 
the shadow economy that we have assigned to the given country shall be considered as foreign 
for the USA but supported with American dollars.
Table 7.
Production sphere energy consumption in world countries estimated using the variable of the 
shadow economy size (OLS*, Dependent variable Ln(Energy consumption in the production 
sphere/GDP), covariance matrix estimated by the White method)
2003, 61 
observations
2004, 58 
observations
2005, 61 
observations
2006, 55 
observations
Constant 1.3921,
t-Value=3.50
1.2341,
t-Value=3.96
1.3281,
t-Value=3.55
1.2012,
t-Value=6.14
Mean annual 
temperature
-.0017,
t-Value=-2.22
-.0017,
t-Value=-2.44
-.0021,
t-Value=-2.99
-.0020,
t-Value=-2.36
Actual energy price: 
Ln(P/pe)
.3825,
t-Value=5.21
.4080,
t-Value=5.38
.2312,
t-Value=2.46
.2940,
t-Value=1.89
Ln(Share of shadow 
economy in GDP)
.8423,
t-Value=3.47
.7259,
t-Value=4.05
.9290,
t-Value=2.91
.7670,
t-Value=5.91
R-squared 0.3143 0.3528 0.2122 0.4485
F-Value 11.33 12.16 8.87 19.16
Root MSE .40345 .36273 .64413 .33637
* No data to form the instrumental variable for the energy price.
Our estimations of  the shadow economy size are  effective  in  explanations of  differences in 
production sphere energy consumption in the world countries.  These regressions are similar to 
the regressions substantiated and constructed in (Suslov, Ageeva, 2005) and are the same as 
those that we used to test the variables of the shadow economy size for the beginning of the 
2000’s  (see  Table  1)  obtained  by  Schneider  (Schneider,  2004).  Along with  the  temperature 
regressors (MEATE) and the relative energy price P/pe, they include the variable of the shadow 
economy size. As noted above, the meaning of the shadow economy size as a regressor consists 
in that it plays the dual role: both as the institutional and structural variable. First, it weighs the 
quality  of  institutions  in  the  countries  and  thus  explains  differences  in  energy  consumption 
efficiency.  In  its  second role,  this  variable  reveals  that  the  energy  consumption observed  is 
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overestimated in  comparison with its  actual  level  because official  statistics  more completely 
reflects energy costs in the shadow sector as compared to the income earned in it. The variable of 
the logarithm of the share of the shadow economy in GDP is significant, which indicates good 
reliability of the used data on the unofficial sector size.
Both systems of estimations (Table 1 and Table 7) have a common year (2003), which allows a 
comparison  of  the  effect  of  two estimates  of  the  shadow economy:  one  obtained  using  the 
DYMIMIC model (Table 1, column 4) and our variables constructed based on the analysis of 
money demand (Table 7,  column 2).  As expected,  elasticity  of the influence of  the shadow 
economy size on the observed indicator of energy consumption is higher when our estimations 
are used than in the case of DYMIMIC estimations: approximately 0.77 against approximately 
0.39,  i.e.  twice.  It  is  natural  to  attribute  the  difference  to  distinctions  between the  real  and 
observed changes in energy consumption, at least partially. The point is that the first method 
involves  a  comparison  of  energy  use  and  the  GDP,  i.e.  in  fact  the  analysis  of  energy 
consumption, as one of the indicators of changes in sizes of shadow economy. Hence, it may 
take  real  changes  in  energy  consumption  for  changes  in  the  size  of  shadow  economy 
overestimating the amplitude of its fluctuations. 
E. Analysis of factors affecting shadow economy sizes
We have developed models that explain, firstly, the effect of real energy price levels on the sizes 
(shares  of  GDP)  of  the  shadow economy (Table  8-9),  and  secondly,  their  changes  causing 
changes in sizes of the unofficial sector (Table 10). For cross country data we used almost the 
same model as in the analysis of shadow economy variables based on the DYMIMIC approach. 
The  only  difference  here  is  that  the  energy  price  enters  in  the  exponential  form  (i.e.,  the 
logarithm of this regressor is not taken for the logarithm of the shadow economy size in the 
specification), which does not change the direction of the effect of the real  energy price: as 
expected, it  positively correlates with the dependent variable assessed. Another regressor, the 
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regulatory quality index, is the same as in the previous model. Its effect on the shadow economy 
size is negative: the better economic policy, the lower is the level of the shadow sector, other 
conditions  being  equal.  Unfortunately,  other  possible  regressors  such  as  per  capita  income, 
inflation, interest rate did not demonstrate high working capacity in our regressions. In order to 
smooth the  problem of  heteroscedasticity  for  all  cross  country models,  we have applied the 
White method to estimate the covariance matrix.  
Since the level of the shadow economy can also affect the institutional environment, including 
the regulatory quality, then along with the ordinary least squares method we employed the model 
of two-stage estimation with instrumental variables. We have chosen the child mortality index as 
a variable used to instrument the regulatory quality factor (see Suslov and Ageeva, 2005). We 
assume that the child mortality level is directly associated with the institutional environment 
quality and only indirectly with the shadow economy. As seen from the comparison of data in 
Tables 8 and 9, both models used produce almost similar results: both factors are permanently 
significant and have the expected signs.  Thus,  we draw a conclusion that in those countries 
where the level of the real energy price is higher, the level of shadow economy was higher, under 
otherwise equal conditions. This can be explained by attempts of the firms to compensate for 
higher costs by additional savings on tax and social payments, which determines their higher 
degree of income concealment.
Table 8.
Estimation of size of the shadow economy in world economies using the variable of the real 
energy price (Dependent variable Ln(Shadow economy share in GDP), covariance matrix 
estimated by the White method)
2003, 61 
observations
2004, 58 
observations
2005, 61 
observations
2006, 55 
observations
Constant -1.1131,
t-Value=-60.94
-1.0460,
t-Value=-44.61
-1.0061,
t-Value=-39.80
-.90902,
t-Value=-18.35
Real energy price: 
P/pe
-.0208,
t-Value=-3.89
-.0356,
t-Value=-3.51
-.0211,
t-Value==2.86
-.1508,
t-Value==2.03
Regulatory quality 
index: RQ
-.2555,
t-Value=-14.40
-.3204,
t-Value=-14.16
-.3503,
t-Value=-12.47
-.3497,
t-Value=-14.65
R-squared 0.8028 0.8137 0.7755 0.8339
F-Value 165.61 151.35 109.58 107.27
Root MSE .11973 .13629 .16282 .13918
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Table 9.
Estimation of size of the shadow economy in world economies using the variable of the real 
energy price based on the IVLS* method (Dependent variable Ln(Shadow economy share in 
GDP), covariance matrix estimated by the White method)
2003, 60 
observations
2004, 57 
observations
2005, 61 
observations
2006, 55 
observations
Constant -1.1148,
t-Value=-64.68
-1.04926,
t-Value=-40.06
-.9903,
t-Value=-32.69
-.91173,
t-Value=-16.40
Real energy price: 
P/pe
-.0208,
t-Value=-3.82
-.0359,
t-Value=-3.41
.0245,
t-Value==-3.14
-.1515,
t-Value==2.03
Regulatory quality 
index: RQ*
-.2542,
t-Value=-13.21
-.3179,
t-Value=-11.73
-.3708
t-Value=-10.76
-.3449,
t-Value=-9.25
R-squared 0.8017 0.8137 0.7729 0.8338
F-Value 126.24 91.85 89.30 42.92
Root MSE .1206 .13699 .16375 .13925
Hausman test, chi2(2),
In parentheses: 
Prob>chi2
0.06 (0.9708) 0.10 (0.9533) 1.04 (0.5943)
* Regulatory quality variable RQ is instrumented using the variable of child mortality
In order to check the actual relation between changes in energy prices, on the one hand, and 
changes in the shadow economy size, on the other hand, we have developed a panel model for 
the period of stable price increase from 2004 to 2006, with 2003 taken as the basic year (Table 
10). To exclude the distorting effect of temporary trends, we started to operate with gains of 
indices  and  activated  the  model  with  random  effects.  The  results  turned  out  to  be  more 
informative than in panel estimates.  Thus,  our hypothesis  that the growth of relative energy 
prices  has  resulted  in  an  increase  in  the  shadow  economy  size  is  proved  because  we 
simultaneously  control  other  factors  that  are  likely  to  affect  the  shadow  economy.  So  we 
introduce the change in the interactive term ln(Tr)·RQ, which is the product of tax burden (Tr is 
the share of tax revenues of the central government in GDP) and the regulatory quality index RQ, 
into the regression with the negative sign. This means that the growth of tax burden has led to an 
increase in the shadow economy size when the regulatory quality worsened, but the growth of 
tax revenues decreased the shadow economy size if at the same time the quality of economic 
policy was improved. This is well consistent with our representations established already at the 
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stage of estimating the shadow economy size (the effect of the variable ln(Tr)·RL see in Table 4 
and specification (4)).  The inflation level has also shown itself  as  a significant factor:  more 
intense  growth of  the average level  of  prices  corresponded to  higher  growth of  the shadow 
economy size.
Table 10
Estimation results of the growth of the shadow economy share in GDP Δln(sm) in world 
economies over the period of  2004-2006 (panel data, model with random effects, 160 
observations, 62 groups)
Coefficient z-Value P>|z|
Constant -.0117 -2.06 0.039
Increment of  ln(P/pE) -.0573 -2.54 0.011
Increment of the interactive term ln(Tr)*RQ -.4737 -2.87 0.004
Variation of the Rule of Law index RL -.2005 -4.96 0.000
Inflation level   .5696   6.07 0.000
Within R-sq 0.1899
Between R-sq 0.5440
Overall R-sq 0.3895
Wald chi2(4)       95.51
sigma_u .00711
sigma_e .04132
Rho .02875
These results both in the meaning of the specification used and in the meaning of statistical tests 
performed seem to be fair. It is possible to conclude that over the period of 2004 to 2006, when a 
stable and rather intense increase in the relative energy prices took place in the world economies 
(see the plot in Fig. 1), this was an independent factor of the growth of the shadow economy size, 
which confirms our working hypothesis.
F. Conclusion
Within the implementation of this project based on the analysis of the money demand method we 
developed the indices of the shadow economy size for samples of 55 to 61 world economies 
(depending on the particular year) for the period of 2003-2006. Since the evaluations by the 
classical scheme proposed by Tanzi (Tanzi, 1983, see also Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004) did 
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not produce significant results, we modified the model to estimate the shadow economy by this 
method. We took into account the effect of the quality of institutions and replaced the variable of 
the labor compensation share in GDP by the variable of the share of subsidies and other transfers 
of GDP that, in our opinion, have high level of monetization. The estimates obtained are highly 
explanatory in the regressions for the observed coefficients of energy consumption. 
Then we constructed regressions for the obtained variables of the shadow economy size for the 
developed samples of the world economies considered over the period of 2003-2006. Our results 
indicate that the hypothesis about the positive correlation between energy prices and the shadow 
economy size is confirmed in both cross country and panel data (i.e. in dynamics). The cross 
country model explaining differences economies includes the regulatory quality index as yet 
another regressor, apart from the real energy price. Both variables are significant and have the 
expected signs. 
In order to analyze the endogeneity problem of the institutional index along with the ordinary 
least squares method we employed the model of two-stage estimation with instrumenting this 
index by the  variable of infant mortality rate. Both methods applied give very similar results. 
Thus, we draw a conclusion that in those economies where the level of the real energy price was 
higher, the level of shadow economy was higher, under otherwise equal conditions. This can be 
explained by that the firms tend to compensate for higher costs by additional savings on tax and 
social payments, which determines their higher degree of income concealment.
Results of the panel model application for the growth rates of indices in the period of 2004-2006 
provide evidence that an increase in relative energy prices resulted in the increased size of the 
shadow economy. This specification, along with the regressor of real price increment, includes a 
change in the interactive term that is the multiplication of tax burden and the regulatory quality 
index. The result shows that the growth of tax burden led to an increase in the shadow economy 
size with worsening regulatory quality, but the growth of tax revenues decreased the shadow 
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economy  size  if  the  regulatory  quality  was  improved.  This  corresponds  well  to  our 
representations established already also at the stage of estimating the shadow economy size. The 
inflation level has also shown itself as a significant factor: more intense growth of the average 
level of prices corresponded to higher growth of the shadow economy size. Thus, our hypothesis 
that the increase in relative energy prices resulted in the increased size of the shadow economy 
was confirmed. 
Our conclusions are also supported by other results that are discussed in the report. We tested the 
alternative data obtained within the approach based on the application of the DYMIMIC model 
(Schneider, 2004), though they are given for an earlier period of 2000-2003. In both cases, the 
empirical results turned out to be very similar. 
Both systems of estimation (Table 1 and Table 7) have a common year, 2003, which allows a 
comparison of the effect of two estimates for the shadow economy: those obtained using the 
DYMIMIC model (Table 1, column 4) and our variables developed based on the analysis of 
money demand (Table 7, column 2). As expected,  the elasticity of the effect of the shadow 
economy size on the index of the observed energy consumption is higher when our estimates are 
used than in the case of DYMIMIC estimations: approximately 0.77 against approximately 0.39, 
i.e.  almost twice. It is natural to attribute this difference to distinctions between the real and 
observed change in energy consumption, at least partially. The point is that the first  method 
involves a comparison of energy use and GDP, i.e. in fact the analysis of energy consumption, as 
one of the indicators of changes in the shadow economy size. Hence, it may take real changes in 
energy consumption for changes in the shadow economy size overestimating the amplitude of its 
fluctuations. 
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G. Appendix
Table A1
Summarizing variables of shadow economy size calculated using the modified method of 
demand for money (sm03, sm04, sm05, sm06) and DYMIMIC approach (ss00, ss02, ss03)
1. Former socialist economies
. summarize  sm03 sm04 sm05 sm06 ss00 ss02 ss03 if dfos==1
    Variable |       Obs                     Mean                Std. Dev.                Min                    Max
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        sm03 |        20                      .3267711           .0592532                .246134             .480375
        sm04 |        18                      .3262653           .0590983                .246191             .450854
        sm05 |        20                      .352597             .0633476                .260173             .477032
        sm06 |        19                      .3631267           .0708329                .265505             .50994
 ------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ss00  |         26                     .3631538            .1298715               .131                    .673
        ss02  |         26                     .3732692            .1299128               .144                    .676
        ss03  |         26                     .3834231            .1296988               .156                    .68
2. CIS economies
. summarize  sm00 sm03 sm04 sm05 sm06 ss00 ss02 ss03 if  dcis==1
    Variable |       Obs                  Mean                Std. Dev.                   Min                    Max
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        sm03 |         6                    .3675915           .0269328                   .340331            .417828
        sm04 |         4                    .3970925           .03866                       .36403              .450854
        sm05 |         7                    .4172                 .0339482                   .378955            .477032
        sm06 |         8                    .4292706           .0388598                   .385469            .50994 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ss00  |        10                   .4828                 .0969832                   .341                   .673
        ss02  |        10                   .4943                 .0939823                   .357                   .676
        ss03  |        10                   .5052                 .0905794                   .372                   .68
3. EE and Baltic Economies
. summarize  sm03 sm04 sm05 sm06 ss00 ss02 ss03 if  deee==1
    Variable |       Obs                 Mean                Std. Dev.                   Min                      Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        sm03 |        13                  .3077095          .0634767                   .246134               .480375
        sm04 |        13                  .3034576          .048208                     .246191               .404666
        sm05 |        12                  .3142065          .0450839                   .260173               .413951
        sm06 |        11                  .315022            .0439157                   .265505              .407717 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ss00  |        14                  .3090714          .0656945                   .189                    .399
        ss02  |        14                  .3177857          .0671201                   .193                    .407
        ss03  |        14                  .3272857          .068375                     .201                    .413
4. OECD economies (without new members)
. summarize  sm03 sm04 sm05 sm06 ss00 ss02 ss03 if  doec==1
    Variable |       Obs                   Mean              Std. Dev.                    Min                     Max
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------ ------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        sm03 |        23                    .2113346         .0358905                    .160474              .275698
        sm04 |        23                    .2015181         .0433578                    .138833              .275229
        sm05 |        23                    .2045492         .0498576                    .131651              .285215
        sm06 |        22                    .2124465         .0559941                    .139914              .343774 
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ss00  |        24                    .1840833         .0689883                     .086                   .321
        ss02  |        24                    .1851667         .0707572                     .087                   .332
        ss03  |        24                    .1826667         .0731001                     .084                   .343
Table A2
Shares of shadow economy in GDP by the world economies (modified method of demand for 
money, variable sm)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Albania 48,0 40,5
Algeria 39,4 41,6 47,7 45,8
Argentina 34,8 37,6 34,0 0,0
Armenia 34,0 36,4 37,9 38,5
Australia 18,8 17,6 17,9 18,4
Austria 19,7 18,7 19,1 19,7
Bangladesh 34,5 36,3
Belarus 41,8 45,1 47,7 51,0
Belgium 19,8 18,6 19,0 20,0
Benin 35,0 37,5 39,8 39,3
Bolivia 33,9 36,7 42,8 43,3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 38,7 38,4 41,4 40,8
Bulgaria 32,1 32,8 36,4 36,6
Cameroon 31,4 32,2 34,0
Canada 23,0 22,1 22,6 23,1
Chile 24,8 24,1 24,1 24,0
China 33,0 33,9 36,1
Colombia 36,7 37,7 40,6 38,9
Congo, Rep. 35,7 32,2
Costa Rica 30,7
Croatia 30,8 31,1 33,2 34,8
Cyprus 24,1 23,7 24,0 23,6
Czech Republic 26,7 27,4 28,2 29,1
Denmark 16,0 13,9 13,2 14,5
Dominican Republic 40,7 39,1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 31,5 32,0 33,7 35,4
El Salvador 33,6 34,5 37,2 38,6
Estonia 27,1 26,3 27,5 27,1
Finland 18,6 17,4 17,3 18,4
France 21,8 20,6 21,3 21,9
Georgia 35,0 39,4 39,1
Germany 24,5 24,3 24,7 25,1
Ghana 32,9 35,4
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Greece 26,6 26,2 28,4 28,7
Guatemala 36,3 37,7 40,2 40,6
Honduras 37,3 39,0 41,8 43,9
Hungary 25,4 25,2 27,1 27,3
Iceland 17,3 15,3 14,0 15,0
India 31,3 32,0 33,2 33,4
Indonesia 36,6 37,5
Iran, Islamic Rep. 32,7 33,9 37,6 37,7
Ireland 20,0 18,4 18,2 17,9
Israel 24,6 24,1 24,8 24,8
Italy 25,5 26,1 28,5 30,4
Ivory Coast 41,5 45,2 49,4 48,2
Jamaica 38,7 39,8 43,7 43,8
Jordan 29,1 28,5 28,8 28,8
Kazakhstan 37,1 39,9 44,1 42,8
Kenya 38,7 41,2 45,4
Korea, Rep. 27,6 27,5 27,9
Kuwait 31,1 31,8 33,5
Kyrgyz Republic 44,8
Latvia 28,6 29,0 30,3 30,4
Lebanon 33,9 33,9 34,0 0,0
Lithuania 28,2 27,9 29,8 30,4
Luxembourg 17,7 16,1 15,9 18,0
Malaysia 28,4 32,2 34,0 34,2
Malta 19,7 19,3 19,3 19,3
Moldova 36,3 37,5 40,2 41,5
Morocco 31,8 31,8 34,9 35,8
Namibia 29,9 32,2
Nepal 35,2 38,6 37,3
Netherlands 19,9 18,6 18,3 18,8
New Zealand 16,1 14,3 13,7 14,0
Nicaragua 35,3 39,1 40,5 42,4
Norway 17,0 14,7 14,4 14,8
Pakistan 35,2 36,9 39,0 38,8
Paraguay 41,4
Peru 34,7 36,5 40,3 34,2
Philippines 34,6 36,3 37,3 38,0
Poland 28,1 29,4 31,1 32,1
Portugal 22,7 22,6 23,6 25,3
Romania 32,5 33,3 35,6
Russian Federation 43,0 43,6
Singapore 23,6 23,0 23,3
Slovak Republic 29,1 28,7 30,6 31,4
Slovenia 24,6 24,6 26,0 26,6
South Africa 31,1 30,7 31,5 31,0
Spain 25,7 26,0 27,2 27,7
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Sri Lanka 31,2 32,2 33,6 33,6
Sweden 19,9 18,6 18,8 19,0
Switzerland 24,3 23,7 24,1
Tanzania 31,4 32,2
Thailand 33,0 34,2
Togo 43,5
Trinidad and Tobago 30,3 33,0 35,6
Tunisia 31,6 30,8
Turkey 34,4
Ukraine 36,4 39,7 42,1
United Kingdom 17,9 16,7 16,9 16,7
United States 25,7 25,7 25,7 25,7
Uruguay 27,5 28,8 30,1 30,4
Venezuela, RB 37,6 40,7 46,7
Zambia 35,9 37,7 40,2 40,7
32
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